The Supreme Court has just handed down judgment in a case that it had to decide because it was a matter of general public interest (to those of us dealing with construction matters, anyway). It relates to contractual interpretation of a clause in the long-standing and widely respected and used standard form contract: Joint Contracts Tribunal 2016 Design & Build Form; moreover, it remains important and relevant since the new edition of the JCT D&B contract published in 2024 includes the same wording of the relevant clause as the 2016 version.
The actual clause in question (clause 8.9) relates to termination of the contract by the contractor. Clause 8.9.1 provides that if an interim payment was not made in the time prescribed by the contract, the contractor could give notice of a 'specified default'. If that specified default was not remedied within 14 days of the notice then under clause 8.9.3 the contractor could terminate the contract.
Clause 8.9.4 deals with what is to happen if a specified default is repeated. It says:
".4 If the Contractor for any reason does not give the further notice referred to in clause 8.9.3, but (whether previously repeated or not):
.1 the Employer repeats a specified default; or
.2 ....
... then, upon or within a reasonable time after such repetition, the Contractor may by notice to the Employer terminate the Contractor's employment under this Contract."
The decision the court had to come to in respect of these terms therefore affects termination rights under clause 8.9 and impacts project risk, payment strategies, and dispute outcomes under both JCT 2016 and 2024.
The facts of this case were that:
The battle lines were therefore drawn on either side of a dispute that could be distilled into the discrete question which was ultimately considered by the Supreme Court:
"Can the contractor terminate its employment under clause 8.9.4 of the JCT 2016 Design and Build Form, in a case where a right to give the further notice referred to in clause 8.9.3 has never previously accrued?"
The pendulum swung in each party's favour as the question proceeded through the various levels of tribunal: adjudication, High Court, Court of Appeal, and Supreme Court. Seeking to derive what is the natural meaning of the clause in question in order that an industry-wide contract can be interpreted consistently, the Supreme Court has settled on the view that it is only if the employer has failed to cure a specified default that the contractor can terminate immediately for a further late payment (having not terminated on the basis of the first notified default in the words of the contract: "for any reason"). If the employer cures the specified default within the requisite period then the contractor's right to serve a further notice based on it expires.
The court considered the different wording in the clauses relating to termination by the employer and termination by the contractor, but decided that the asymmetrical position was consequential to the differing contractual obligations of the parties. The difference did not justify doing violence to the natural meaning of the words to combat contractor's cash-flow problems.
The judgment concluded that if and so far as the contractor does, or does not, have other satisfactory methods of combating cash-flow problems caused by late payment, that is a matter for the JCT to consider "in the light of this judgment" in a future draft of the standard form contract. Meanwhile, even if an employer is routinely late in payment of application sums under the relevant contracts, if the sums are paid before the expiry of the specified default period the contractor cannot terminate the contract under clause 8.9.